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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to advance a fine-grained understanding of the relationship between host-country 
institutions and foreign subsidiary survival by unbundling host-country institutions into contracting 
institutions and property rights institutions as well as engaging subsidiary-level heterogeneity. We 
argue that the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions are stronger for market-seeking 
subsidiaries than resource-seeking subsidiaries. In contrast, we contend that weak property rights 
institutions are more detrimental to the survival of resource-seeking subsidiaries. Data from a 
longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese foreign subsidiaries operating across 46 countries 
provide support for these arguments. These results (a) contribute to gaining a more fine-grained 
understanding of whether and how institutions relate to subsidiary survival and (b) underscore the 
need to better understand institutional diversity as well as subsidiary heterogeneity.  
Keywords:  Contracting institutions, property rights institutions, foreign subsidiary survival, market- 
         seeking subsidiaries, resource-seeking subsidiaries.
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1. Introduction  
The questions of whether and how host-country institutions relate to foreign subsidiary 
survival have been central to research in the field of international business (IB) and attracted 
considerable scholarly attention. Research in the area suggests that foreign subsidiaries operating in 
host countries with weak formal institutions face economic challenges in the forms of contractual 
(e.g., Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Getachew & Beamish, 2017) and property 
rights (e.g., Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Jiménez et al., 2014) hazards. Its 
contributions notwithstanding, research in the area has paid limited attention to subsidiary 
heterogeneity (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Meyer, Li, & Schotter, 2020). In fact, the investment 
motives literature (e.g., Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010) and the subsidiary 
mandate literature (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) have underscored the strategic and structural 
heterogeneity among foreign subsidiaries. Such heterogeneity can have implications for which 
institutional components are more relevant and salient (or less so) (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Hence, addressing this limitation is key to developing a more complete understanding of whether and 
how formal institutions relate to subsidiary survival. 
In this paper, we seek to respond to this concern by engaging institutional diversity and 
subsidiary heterogeneity. Following Acemoglu & Johnson (2005), we unbundle host-country 
institutions into contracting institutions and property rights institutions and study their implications for the 
survival likelihood of market-seeking and resource-seeking subsidiaries. In doing so, we draw on 
studies pointing to the importance of advancing a more fine-grained understanding of institutions 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Taussig & Delios, 2015) and those suggesting potential for heterogeneity 
in institutional components and their implications (e.g., Aguilera & Grøgaard, 2019; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008). Further, we examine subsidiary heterogeneity by integrating insights from the investment 
motives literature (e.g., Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010) and the subsidiary mandates (charters) literature 
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(e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998), both of which have advanced our understanding of the substantial 
differences among foreign subsidiaries (even among those under the same parent). We argue that the 
variation in the kind of foreign activities which subsidiaries perform has an important implication for 
the relationship between institutions and foreign subsidiary survival. We empirically examine this 
argument using longitudinal data on Japanese subsidiaries operating in 46 countries.  
Our study makes two important contributions to the literature on subsidiary survival. First, by 
unbundling host-country institutions into contracting and property rights institutions, this study 
advances a more nuanced understanding of when and how institutions relate to foreign subsidiary 
survival. In doing so, it responds to calls to disentangle the concept of institutions and develop a better 
understanding of institutional diversity (e.g., Aguilera & Grøgaard, 2019; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
Second, we bring to the fore the issue of subsidiary heterogeneity in investment motivations and 
examine whether/how such heterogeneity influences the relationship between host-country 
institutions and foreign subsidiary survival. Whereas extant research on foreign subsidiary survival has 
examined the effects of various subsidiary-levels factors (e.g., subsidiary size, ownership, and mode of 
entry)(Benito, 1997; Berry, 2013; Tan & Sousa, 2017), limited attention has been paid to understanding 
whether and how variations in investment motivations influence subsidiary survival (Getachew & 
Beamish, 2017; Lee, Chung, & Beamish, 2019). As well, extant research in the area provides mixed 
evidence. Whereas some research suggests that weak institutions are more detrimental to market-
seeking subsidiaries (Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008), other research finds that weak institutions 
adversely affect resource-seeking subsidiaries (e.g., Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Our approach of 
unbundling institutions and their implications can help in resolving this contradiction. 
The following section presents theoretical arguments in support of our hypotheses. We then 
discuss the research design employed to empirically test the hypotheses and describe the sample and 
the variables used. Next, we present the research findings and discuss associated implications. We 
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conclude by discussing contributions to theory and practice, highlighting limitations, and indicating 
promising directions for future research. 
2. Theoretical development 
2.1. Foreign subsidiary survival 
Research on foreign subsidiary survival has documented the implications of institutional-and 
subsidiary-level factors. The stream of research examining institutional factors leveraged insights 
mainly from two different streams of literature on institutions and their influences. The first follows 
the institutional voids approach and examines institutional hazards from a perspective of the lack and/or 
absence of institutional mechanisms to support market exchanges (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017; 
Mair & Marti, 2009). The second uses the political institutions approach to examine institutional hazards 
from a perspective of institutions that aim to constrain the behavior and actions of host governments 
(e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Scholars drawing on these approaches have 
studied contracting institutions and property rights institutions, producing a large body of evidence 
on how contractual and expropriation hazards affect foreign subsidiary survival (e.g., Blake & 
Moschieri, 2017; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
The stream of research examining the implications of subsidiary-level factors for survival has 
examined the ‘how’ and more recently the ‘why’ questions associated with foreign operations. 
Research on the ‘how’ questions of foreign operations looked into the implications of entry mode 
choices (e.g., Gaur & Lu, 2007), establishment mode (e.g., Mata & Portugal, 2000), ownership level 
(e.g., Gaur & Lu, 2007), and the type of diversification (e.g., Benito, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Tan & 
Sousa, 2017). In contrast, research on the ‘why’ questions has examined the implications of investment 
motivations and foreign activities (Lee et al., 2019; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). In this study, we 
integrate insights from the streams of research on institutions and subsidiary heterogeneity in foreign 
activities to develop a better understanding of foreign subsidiary survival.  
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2.2. Foreign subsidiary heterogeneity 
Research in the investment motives literature as well as the subsidiary charter/mandate 
literature has documented that foreign subsidiaries differ in their underlying motivation and the kinds 
of value-adding activities they perform (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Some foreign investments are primarily motivated by the desire to leverage host-country market 
opportunities (i.e., market-seeking subsidiaries), whereas others aim at accessing host-country 
resources (i.e., resource-seeking subsidiaries); some perform local production and/or distribution 
activities, whereas others perform activities that are part of the global value-chain of their respective 
parent firm (Brouthers et al., 2008; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). In fact, the underlying motivation(s) 
of foreign investments are reflected in the type of activities performed by foreign subsidiaries (Caves, 
2007; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Market-seeking subsidiaries seek to substitute exporting and serve the host-country market 
closely through local production and distribution (Brouthers et al., 2008). Structurally, market-seeking 
subsidiaries are loosely coupled with both their respective parent firm(s) and sister subsidiaries. In 
fact, such subsidiaries tend to operate as stand-alone units and perform several value-chain activities—
including production, marketing and sales—in the host country (Caves, 2007; Zaheer, 1995). 
Strategically, market-seeking subsidiaries tend to focus on host (or regional) market opportunities and 
face higher pressure for local responsiveness (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Lee et al., 2019). As such, 
they “…try to maintain close ties with their customers, participate in local networks to obtain local 
market knowledge, and often rely on local suppliers,” (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010, p. 982).  
In contrast, resource-seeking subsidiaries result from the desire by the parent firm to 
internalize factor or intermediate product markets (Caves, 2007). Such subsidiaries seek to extract 
and/or process host-country resources for eventual transfer and use within the MNE (Caves, 2007; 
Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Unlike market-seeking subsidiaries, resource-seeking subsidiaries are 
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often part of the global value-chain of their respective parent(s). Hence, such subsidiaries tend to be 
tightly coupled with their parent(s) as well as sister subsidiaries and exercise less autonomy than do 
market-seeking subsidiaries (Caves, 2007; Zaheer, 1995). As well, in contrast to market-seeking 
subsidiaries, resource-seeking subsidiaries tend to have limited participation in and linkage to local 
networks (Hansen, Pedersen, & Petersen, 2009). See Table A1 in the Online Appendix for a summary 
of the key differences between these two types of subsidiaries. 
2.3. The effect of contracting institutions  
In an influential study, Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) unbundled formal institutions into 
contracting institutions, which support private contracts (i.e., between firms), and property rights 
institutions, which constrain expropriation by governments and powerful elites. This classification is 
a useful departure from the aggregated (clustered) consideration of institutions and is consistent with 
research in the field of political economy (e.g., Lobsiger & Zahner, 2012). Contracting institutions 
support exchanges by reducing transaction costs involved in monitoring and enforcing contracts 
(Santangelo, Meyer, & Jindra, 2016; Williamson, 1985). In host countries where contracting 
institutions are weak (i.e., weak judiciary and court systems), foreign subsidiaries are likely to face 
greater levels of contractual hazards (Santangelo et al., 2016). In response, subsidiaries may put in 
place governance structures to safeguard transactions against the hazards of opportunism (Sartor & 
Beamish, 2018; Williamson, 1985). In doing so, they incur costs to ‘internalize’ functions and/or use 
alternative forms of contracting such as relational contracting (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006). These 
cost pressures may undermine the net-benefits of operating in the host country.  
However, the vulnerability to contractual hazards (and thus the value of contracting 
institutions) varies among subsidiaries based on the kinds of activities they perform (Smit, Pennings, 
& Van Bekkum, 2017; Taussig & Delios, 2015).  We argue that the adverse effects of weak contracting 
institutions are stronger for market-seeking subsidiaries than resource-seeking subsidiaries. Unlike 
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resource-seeking subsidiaries, which tend to be globally integrated, market-seeking subsidiaries 
emphasize local responsiveness (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). To this end, market-seeking 
subsidiaries often finds it important to work with local suppliers (Caves, 2007; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010). Further, market-seeking subsidiaries tend to enjoy a greater degree of autonomy and operate 
with lower levels of intra-MNE coordination (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Consequently, such subsidiaries tend to form broader local linkages than their counterparts (Jindra, 
Giroud, & Scott-Kennel, 2009). Such linkages, especially in locations where contracting institutions 
are weak, can increase exposure to contractual hazards. As a result, market-seeking subsidiaries may 
incur higher costs associated with preventing and/or resolving contractual hazards.  
Relatedly, research suggests that market-seeking subsidiaries tend to exhibit a high degree of 
contract intensity (Nunn, 2007). More contractually intensive businesses are likely to thrive in locations 
with strong contracting institutions. Sen & Sinha (2017), for example, noted that businesses with high 
degree of contract intensity face substantial contractual hazards when they operate in host-countries 
with weak contracting institutions. In contrast, those with low degree of contract intensity fared better 
in such countries. A related line of research finds the presence of greater resource-seeking activities in 
countries with less developed contracting institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton, 2009). The 
above arguments point to the difficulty of operating market-seeking subsidiaries in host countries 
where institutions supporting/enforcing market contracts are weak. Therefore, we forward the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The adverse effects of weak contracting institutions on foreign subsidiary survival are stronger 
for market-seeking subsidiaries than resource-seeking subsidiaries. 
 
2.4. The effect of property rights institutions  
The protection of property rights in foreign locations is an important issue of practical concern 
for MNEs and their subsidiaries. We define property rights as the rights to use, appropriate returns 
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from, and change the form and/or substance of assets and resources (Foss & Foss, 2005). Property 
right institutions provide mechanisms to limit government and elite expropriation of assets/resources 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; North, 1993).  Foreign subsidiaries operating in host countries where 
property rights institutions are weak face greater levels of expropriation hazards. In such countries, 
government officials and elites enjoy greater levels of discretion. As a result, government officials find 
it easier to alter regulations and/or policies in a manner that makes continued operation less desirable. 
Research in the policy risks literature suggests that, in host-countries with weak property rights 
institutions, subsidiaries need to live with the threat of the host government altering policies to 
expropriate profits and/or assets (Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). A survey conducted by the 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) identified property rights hazard as one of the main 
reasons for the intention of some Japanese firms to either withdraw their business operations from 
Africa or relocate elsewhere in the continent (JETRO, 2014). 
This general observation notwithstanding, we argue that the adverse effects of weak property 
rights institutions are likely to be stronger for resource-seeking subsidiaries than market-seeking 
subsidiaries. Resource-seeking investments result from MNE desire to leverage location-specific 
advantages (i.e., host-country resources) (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Such emphasis on host-
country resources may lead to the perception of such subsidiaries as exploiting valuable resources and, 
in some countries, as extensions of imperialistic rule (Chironga et al., 2011). As such, host governments 
may find it less politically costly (or more beneficial) to take a tougher stance on such subsidiaries. 
Market-seeking subsidiaries, on the other hand, tend to draw more heavily on firm-specific advantages 
(FSA) (managerial as well as technological) (Mohr, Batsakis, & Stone, 2018). This distinct characteristic 
of market-seeking subsidiaries can have at least two related implications. First, the relatively heavier 
reliance on intangible managerial and technological FSA reduces the incentive for host governments 
to expropriate assets of such subsidiaries as it is going to be difficult to (a) properly run the business 
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post takeover and (b) extract value out of its intangible FSAs. Second, through their relationships with 
local actors, market-seeking subsidiaries are likely to generate spillover advantages and facilitate 
technology transfer (Bucheli & Kim, 2015; Caves, 2007; Jindra et al., 2009). Given the strategic 
importance of such advantages for host-country economic development, market-seeking subsidiaries 
are less likely to face value appropriation and expropriation pressures (Bucheli & Kim, 2015; Delios 
& Henisz, 2000).  
Structurally, market-seeking subsidiaries tend to perform most or all of their value-chain 
activities in the host country. This enhances the host-country legitimacy of such subsidiaries since they 
would be perceived as contributing more to host-country economic development and industrialization 
(Bucheli & Kim, 2015). In contrast, resource-seeking subsidiaries tend to be part of their parent’s 
global value chain and perform a limited range of activities in the host country (Nachum & Zaheer, 
2005; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Such structural disparity is likely to generate important differences 
in the relationship dynamics between host-country governments and foreign subsidiaries. In an effort 
to ensure that more of the value from businesses benefits local enterprises, host governments in 
developing countries may exert pressure over resource-seeking subsidiaries. In fact, many are urging 
that such subsidiaries engage in more local value creation and downstream value-adding activities (Ellis 
et al., 2018; Hausmann, Klinger, & Lawrence, 2007; Jindra et al., 2009). Such pressures can adversely 
affect resource-seeking subsidiaries as they may be required to perform more of the value-chain 
activities in the host country. The following statement from Nigeria’s Minister of State for Petroleum 
Resource captures the essence of such challenges facing resource-seeking subsidiaries: 
We would get to a point where Nigeria, definitely, would be a major supplier of refined 
petroleum products. It just has to happen. Nothing else makes sense…. We are also saying 
directly to oil companies that a time would also come when we would not be open to see them 
move around all the crude oil they produce in Nigeria…. We will like to see integrated refining 





In fact, governments in other countries such as Tanzania, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Gabon 
have directly or indirectly pressured foreign subsidiaries into performing more value-adding activities 
locally (Fliess, Idsardi, & Rossouw, 2017). Put together, weak property rights institutions are more 
detrimental to the survival of resource-seeking subsidiaries than market-seeking subsidiaries. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2. The adverse effect of weak property rights institutions on foreign subsidiary survival is stronger 
for resource-seeking subsidiaries than for market-seeking subsidiaries. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Data and sample 
We tested our hypotheses using longitudinal data of Japanese foreign investments across a 
number of host countries. We obtained subsidiary-level data from the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran 
(Japan Overseas Investment) directory. The directory, based on an annual survey of general managers of 
Japanese foreign subsidiaries, is suitable for testing our hypotheses for several reasons. First, the 
longitudinal nature of the data increases confidence in the results and arguments (Bono & McNamara, 
2011). Second, the comprehensive coverage of Japanese foreign investment across host countries with 
disparate levels of contracting and property rights institutions provides an ideal context. Third, the 
focus on a single home country (i.e., Japan) helps control for empirical complications arising from 
home-country effects. We obtained relevant parent-level data from the Nikkei Economic Electronic 
Databank System dataset, which reports information on firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Following Beamish & Inkpen (1998), we limited our sample to subsidiaries with a minimum 
of 20 employees to ensure that our focus would be on FDIs with considerable host-country 
investments. Per Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino (1994), subsidiaries require at least two years to 
stabilize. Thus, we removed from the sample subsidiaries with less than two years of operation. To 
address a potential self-selection bias in our sample, we employed the Coarsened Exact Matching 
procedure (CEM), which is better than other commonly used matching methods in reducing 
imbalance, model dependence, and statistical bias (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2011). Our final sample 
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includes 374 Japanese subsidiaries operating in countries with contrasting levels of institutional 
development over the period of 1991-2017.1 See Table A2 in the Online Appendix for results from the 
t-test of means and probit regression used to examine the success of the CEM procedure.  
3.2. Measure 
3.2.1. Dependent variable.  
Foreign subsidiary survival is measured by an indicator, which takes a value of 0 if subsidiary 
i survives at time t and 1 otherwise. Following previous studies that used the same dataset, a subsidiary 
is considered to have survived when its records are available in the dataset (Delios & Beamish, 2001). 
The data we use for the study are published on a yearly basis, so this is our metric for time.  
3.2.2. Independent variables.  
We measured contracting institutions using the index of enforcing contracts from World Bank’s 
data on doing business. The index constitutes the number of procedures required, the time in days needed, 
and the cost incurred to enforce market contracts. The composite index (i.e., enforcing contracts) can assume 
values ranging from zero to 100, higher values indicating stronger institutions. This index provides 
annual data on how complex it is for foreign subsidiaries to resolve market contracts in a given host 
country (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) and has been frequently used in previous studies (e.g., Acemoglu 
& Johnson, 2005; Lobsiger & Zahner, 2012).  
To determine the strength of property rights institutions facing foreign subsidiaries in their 
respective host countries, we used the POLCON measure of political constraints that captures the 
distribution of power across the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and 
 
1 Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Cambodia, Laos, Taiwan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, 




provides an estimate of how difficult it is for the host government to expropriate subsidiary revenue 
and assets (Delios & Henisz, 2000). In the POLCON measure, a value of zero indicates the absence 
of constraints and thus the weakest property rights institutions, whereas a value of 1 represents complete 
constraints and thus the strongest property rights institutions. We multiplied the POLCON values by 
100 to align this measure with the contract institutions measure and facilitate interpretation of findings. 
The POLCON measure varies yearly.2 The POLCON measure is widely used to capture the extent of 
constraints (limits) on a host-government’s power to act against the interests of foreign subsidiaries 
(e.g., Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Macher & Mayo, 2015).  
We developed the subsidiary motivation variable out of the Japan Overseas Investment directory, 
which provides data on subsidiary investment purposes as reported by their respective general 
managers. Drawing on extant research in the investment motives literature, we classified as market-seeking 
subsidiaries those reporting purposes of “local market expansion”, “construction of international 
distribution network”, and “building new business” and as resource-seeking subsidiaries those reporting 
purposes of “resource & material”, “labor seeking”, and “reverse import to Japan” (Caves, 2007; Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). 3 Consequently, we developed a dichotomous variable, 
which assumes a value of ‘1’ for market-seeking subsidiaries and ‘0’ for resource-seeking subsidiaries. Our 
use of primary, self-reported data overcomes the limitations of indirect measures (such as those based on 
export activity) used in prior research (e.g., Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). As well, the measure and approach 
we used here are consistent with recent research in the area (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Jiang, 
Holburn, & Beamish, 2017).  
 
2 The latest version of the POLCON dataset provides yearly data up to 2016. Given that our study period also includes 2017, we used 
the 2016 data for 2017 as well. 
3 When the reported purposes include “preferential treatment by local government”, “export to third countries”, and “follow 
customers, suppliers, and related companies”, we consulted secondary sources to determine subsidiary motivation (i.e., market-seeking 
or resource-seeking). We excluded cases reporting purposes other than those mentioned in this paper such as “collection of 
information, knowledge seeking, royalty” and “research, development, product planning”. 
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3.2.3. Control variables.  
We included several control variables to account for factors that can influence subsidiary 
survival. We controlled for subsidiary size using the natural log of the number of subsidiary employees. 
This variable is time variant. The introduction of this variable can serve to account for the effects of 
such subsidiary-level features as economies of scale and position/importance within the MNE network (Yang, 
Mudambi, & Meyer, 2008). We also controlled for subsidiary age to account for the effects of 
subsidiary experience (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982). We also accounted for the effects of foreign 
ownership level, measured as the combined percentage of equity ownership of the foreign partners in 
the focal subsidiary. To control for the potential effects of expatriate deployment (Tan & Mahoney, 
2006), we included an expatriate ratio variable, measured as a ratio of the number of expatriates to the 
total number of employees in the focal subsidiary. We control for the potential effect of subsidiary 
performance using the natural log of subsidiary productivity, measured as a ratio of subsidiary sales to 
the number of employees. This is a time-variant variable. Further, we included in our models the 
number of Japanese parents to account for its potential effects on subsidiary survival through, for 
example, managerial complexity (Makino & Beamish, 1998).  
Larger MNEs are likely to enjoy greater flexibility in reallocating their resources across a 
broader portfolio of subsidiaries (Delios & Beamish, 2001). As such, we controlled for the potential 
effects of such flexibility by introducing a parent size variable for which we used the natural log of the 
combined number of employees of the parent firm(s) as a proxy. We also introduced a parent-level 
research and development (R&D) intensity variable, as intangible assets of the parent firm(s) can 
influence survival. This variable is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales of the 
parent firm(s). Both parent size and R&D intensity variables are time-variant. We also controlled for 
the effect of host-country experience using the natural log of the total number of years of experience 
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in the host country by the parent firm(s) prior to the establishment of a focal subsidiary (Delios & 
Beamish, 2001).  
We also controlled for host-country population size as it may determine attractiveness to 
market-seeking subsidiaries, which focus on host-country market (Brouthers et al., 2008). We also 
introduced to our models the level of host-country total factor productivity as it may influence the 
subsidiary survival. Further, we controlled for host-country real GDP levels. We obtained data on 
population, total factor productivity, and real GDP levels from the World Bank. These are time-variant 
variables. We log transformed these variables. As well, we used sector and period fixed effects to 
account for the effects of sector and time effects on subsidiary survival. We achieved these by 
introducing ten sector dummies and four period dummies. Further, to account for the potential 
implications of home and host country relations for subsidiary survival, we controlled for economic 
relations and political relations between home and host countries. We controlled for the economic 
relations between home and host country using the number of Japanese foreign subsidiaries operating 
in the host country. To account for the effect of political relations between home and host country, 
we introduced a political relations variable, which is measured using the alignment of votes in the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly between Japan (i.e., the home country) and the host country 
(Gartzke, 2008). Both the economic and political relations variables are time variant.  
3.3. Modeling procedure 
We used the extended Cox proportional hazard model, which accommodates for the time-
variant nature of some of the covariates we used (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005).  This analytical approach 
examines the relationship of the hazard distribution to covariates and develops a hazard function to 
predict the probability that a subsidiary experience an event (i.e., divestment), given that it has survived 
to time t. The approach is superior to logit or probit models as it (a) enables us to examine subsidiary 
survival over time and (b) corrects for problems associated with right-censoring of subsidiaries which 
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have survived the study period but may fail to survive later (Singer & Willet, 2003). Since subsidiary 
age data is included in our models, left truncation was not a series concern (Guo, 1993). To account 
for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and deal with the multilevel data structure, we used the 
strata option in the stcox estimation in STATA version 16. Consequently, we specified baseline hazard 
for each stratum of sectors and periods. 
4. Results 
4.1. Main findings 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlation among the variables. We ran collinearity 
diagnostics and computed variance inflation factors (VIFs). The calculated VIFs for our variables of 
interest were well below 5, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Table 2 reports results from the extended Cox proportional hazard models. To estimate 
regression parameters, we use the partial likelihood procedure. We followed the estimation procedure 
outlined in Singer & Willet (2003) and first fitted the full model (i.e., Model 7), which includes all the 
covariates and interactions. We then tested for the significance by dropping one or more variables 
from the full model and comparing the log-likelihood of each nested model to that of the full model. 
Tests based on Schoenfeld residuals suggest that the proportional-hazards assumption was not 
violated (χ2 = 24.19, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.72).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The positive, statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term between contracting 
institutions and subsidiary activity variables provides support for Hypothesis 1 (𝛽𝛽 = 0.019, 𝜌𝜌 < 0.05, 
Model 7 in Table 2), which states that weak contracting institutions are more detrimental to the 
survival of market-seeking subsidiaries than resource-seeking subsidiaries. The coefficient 
15 
 
corresponds to a hazard ratio (i.e., 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽) of 1.02, which suggests that the adverse effect of weak 
contracting institutions is stronger for market-seeking subsidiaries. We plot in Fig. 1 the interaction 
effect to facilitate interpretation and show the practical significance of our results. The plots in Fig. 
1a and Fig. 1b depict the survival probabilities of market-seeking and resource-seeking subsidiaries in 
host countries with contracting institutions levels of at most 44 (i.e., 1SD below the mean) and at least 
80 (i.e., 1SD above the mean). All other covariates were held at mean values. The plots allow for cross-
group comparisons as suggested by Zelner (2009) and generate useful insights regarding the 
substantive/economic significance of our findings.  
The overall pattern in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and indicates that 
the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions are stronger for market-seeking subsidiaries. For 
instance, the probability for market-seeking subsidiaries surviving at the end of the study period (i.e., 
2017) falls from about 97 percent in locations of strong contracting institutions (i.e., above 1SD of 
the mean) to roughly 70 percent in locations of weak contracting institutions (i.e., below 1SD of the 
mean). The change in survival probability for resource-seeking subsidiaries is less sharp, decreasing 
from about 83 percent in locations of strong contracting institutions to roughly 75 percent in locations 
of weak contracting institutions.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We also find statistical support for Hypothesis 2, which predicts that the adverse effect of 
property rights institutions is stronger for resource-seeking subsidiaries than for market-seeking 
subsidiaries (𝛽𝛽 = -0.027, 𝜌𝜌 < 0.05, Model 7 in Table 2). The corresponding hazard ratio (i.e., 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽) is 
0.97, suggesting that weak property rights institutions are more detrimental to the survival of resource-
seeking subsidiaries. We plot the interaction effect in Fig. 2 below. The plots in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b 
show the survival probabilities of market-seeking and resource-seeking subsidiaries in host countries 
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with property rights institutions levels of less than 15 (i.e., 1SD below the mean), and more than 55 
(i.e., 1SD above the mean).  In line with Hypothesis 2, the plots demonstrate how the adverse effects 
of weak property rights institutions are stronger for resource-seeking subsidiaries than market-seeking 
subsidiaries. For example, the probability of resource-seeking subsidiaries surviving at the end of the 
study period drops from about 87 percent in locations of strong property rights institutions to about 
72 percent in locations of weak property rights institutions. In contrast, the survival probability for 
market-seeking subsidiaries remain roughly the same across these locations.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
4.2. Robustness tests 
We examine the robustness of our findings to variations in estimation procedures, data 
sources, and model specifications. Self-selection bias may occur when MNEs decide to pursue market-
seeking or resource-seeking motivations. To examine whether our findings have been affected by such 
a possibility, we tested the sensitivity of our findings to the use of an alternative sample of subsidiaries, 
developed by matching market-seeking with resource-seeking subsidiaries, and an alternative matching 
procedure (i.e., propensity score matching). Our results remained robust. Whereas the use of paired-
sample design contributes to mitigating endogeneity concern from observable self-selection bias, 
endogeneity concerns arising from unobserved heterogeneity remain (Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 
2012). As such, we tested the robustness of our results using the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
approach, which generates unbiased and consistent estimates from non-linear second stage models 
such as Cox regression model (Terza, Baus, & Rathouz, 2008).  For the purpose, we used legal origin 
(i.e., common law or civil law) and latitude, in absolute values, of the capital city of the host country as 
instruments for contracting institutions and property rights institutions respectively (Acemoglu & 
Johnson, 2005; Landes, 1998). We also included the squared terms of these exogenous variables as 
additional instruments. We obtained qualitatively similar results.  
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As well, we examined the sensitivity of our findings to how we measured our variables. We 
used the “rule of law” and the “control of corruption” indices from the World Bank’s Governance 
indicator dataset (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005) as alternative measures for the contracting 
institutions and property rights institutions, respectively. Further, we reestimated our models with 
added controls for mode of ownership (i.e., joint venture or wholly owned), regional effects (Rugman 
& Verbeke, 2004), and host-country corporate tax rate (Farah et al., 2021). While the values of the 
estimates differ, their signs and statistical significance remain the same. See Table A3 in the Online 
Appendix for results from the robustness tests. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Integrating insights from the new institutional economics and IB research on investment 
motives, this study contributes to research on foreign subsidiary survival.  We examined the 
implications of contracting institutions and property rights institutions for foreign subsidiaries with 
market-seeking and resource-seeking motivations. We find empirical evidence pointing to subsidiary 
heterogeneity in the effects of host-country institutions: whereas weak contracting institutions are 
more detrimental to market-seeking subsidiaries, weak property rights institutions have a greater 
adverse effect on the survival of resource-seeking subsidiaries.  These findings emphasize the need for 
us to better understand subsidiary heterogeneity and advance a more fine-grained understanding of 
host-country institutions (Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Bucheli & Kim, 2015; Smit et al., 2017).  
5.1. Theoretical implications 
This study contributes to theoretical development on the broader issues of host-country 
institutions and their implications for subsidiary survival in at least two ways. First, it underscores the 
importance of disaggregating host-country institutions and examining their respective implications. 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence point to the merits of doing so. The institutional 
diversity literature, for example, emphasizes the limits of an aggregated view of institutional hazards 
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by highlighting the diversity and heterogeneity in the development of specific components (e.g., 
Aguilera & Grøgaard, 2019; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Likewise, research drawing on the new 
institutional economics literature has underlined the importance of distinguishing between the key 
dimensions of institutional hazards (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Taussig & Delios, 2015). Empirical 
evidence also points to the variation in the development of contracting and property rights institutions. 
For example, Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff (2002) noted that the executive branch of the 
government in Russia has limited constraint on its power (i.e., weaker property rights institutions), but 
the courts function reasonably well (i.e., stronger contracting institutions). Fernandez & Kraay (2007) 
pointed to a similar contrasting development of contracting and property rights institutions in India 
and Bangladesh.  
Second, the findings described above emphasize the need to engage the why question of foreign 
investments and move away from treating all foreign investments as homogenous. Whereas the 
investment motives literature (e.g., Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) and the subsidiary mandate literature 
(e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) have emphasized the inherent strategic as well as structural 
differences among foreign subsidiaries, much of the research on host-country institutions has yet to 
fully leverage this insight. The results of this study point to the importance of engaging such subsidiary 
heterogeneity. In like vein, this study draws attention to foreign investment motivation and how it 
informs our understanding of the relationship between host-country institutions and foreign 
subsidiary survival (Dunning & Zhang, 2008).  
The findings of our study also contribute to research on foreign divestment (e.g., Benito, 2005; 
Berry, 2010; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). Specifically, we find evidence pointing to the potential 
disparity in the implications of institutions supporting market contracts and property rights. That is, 
whereas resource-seeking subsidiaries appear to be more sensitive to the development (strength) of 
property rights institutions, market-seeking subsidiaries exhibit greater sensitivity to the development 
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(strength) of contracting institutions. An explanation of this difference rests in the structural and 
strategic heterogeneity between the two forms of subsidiaries (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Slangen & 
Beugelsdijk, 2010). The greater focus on host-country market (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) and 
contractual intensity of market-seeking subsidiaries (Nunn, 2007) can explain their sensitivity to the 
strength of institutions supporting market contracts. In contrast, the limited involvement in multiple 
phases of the local value chain (Hausmann et al., 2007) and the greater asset specificity of resource-
seeking subsidiaries (Dunning & Lundan, 2008) can help explain their sensitivity to the strength of 
property rights institutions.  
5.2. Practical implications 
Our findings have several important implications for practitioners. The findings emphasize 
the need for managers to better understand the potentially different implications of the different 
components of host-country institutions. As well, the findings offer useful insights about how the 
effects of these components can be contingent on the kind of foreign activities which subsidiaries 
perform. Our findings suggest that management of resource-seeking subsidiaries need to pay more 
attention to developments in property rights institutions than in contracting institutions. In contrast, 
management of market-seeking subsidiaries need to follow more closely developments in contracting 
institutions. The results of the study can also inform policymaking in developing countries by 
providing useful insights on how the weakness of institutions supporting market contracts and 
property rights relate to the retention/loss of MNE investments and associated opportunities. As well, 
our paper suggests that host countries seeking to engage in economic upgrading and locally retain as 
much of the value in global value chains may find it useful to work on improving their contracting 
institutions. Further, our paper emphasizes the need for policymakers to understand subsidiary 




5.3. Limitations and extensions 
Despite its merits, this study has limitations, which offer fruitful avenues for future research. 
The use of subsidiaries from a single home country may limit the generalizability of its findings. Future 
research needs to examine whether the findings generalize to subsidiaries from other home countries. 
That said, it should be noted that the use of a single home country serves a useful empirical purpose 
of controlling for variance arising from home-country heterogeneity. As well, we understand the 
limitations in the proxies and/or measures we used for the core constructs of this study. Although we 
tested for the robustness of our findings using alternative proxies and/or measures, future research in 
the area would benefit from a clearer definition of the constructs and validation of the measures.  
Further, future research can advance a better understanding of host-country institutions and 
their implication by leveraging insights from literature on ‘institutions as a source of comparative 
advantage’ (e.g., Nunn, 2007). This literature discusses how strong contracting institutions can provide 
comparative advantage for such contract-intensive industries as automobile and light truck 
manufacturing (Nunn & Trefler, 2014). Another interesting area lies in examining the implications of 
changes in the policy environment of subsidiaries. For example, it would be important to look into 
the processes and implications of changes initiated by some developing-country governments in 
requiring MNEs to locally perform more downstream activities (Bucheli & Kim, 2015; Hausmann et 
al., 2007). Such research can advance our understanding of how property rights institutions (or host-
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Table 1  
Correlations and descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
(1) Subsidiary size 3.69  1.99                   
(2) Subsidiary age 17.42 12.62  0.16                  
(3) Ownership 
ratio 
57.91 41.85 -0.28  0.00                 
(4) Expat ratio 0.11  0.20 -0.43 -0.14  0.22                
(5) Subsidiary 
performance 
3.83  2.15  0.29 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03               
(6) Subsidiary 
motivation 
0.47  0.50  0.01 -0.08  0.01  0.04  0.01              
(7) Parent R&D 
intensity 
0.04  0.03 -0.04 -0.05  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.02             
(8) Parent size 9.27  1.83  0.31  0.12 -0.20 -0.22  0.10 -0.05 -0.08            
(9) Foreign 
parents  
1.25  0.72  0.10 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 -0.00  0.04 -0.12           
(10) Host-country 
experience 
1.62  2.34 -0.01 -0.15 -0.20 -0.05  0.17  0.01 -0.01  0.31 0.01          
(11) Population 3.55 1.43  0.08 -0.01 -0.20 -0.08  0.08 -0.01  0.00 -0.06 0.08 0.14         
(12) Real GDP 13.05 2.13  0.04  0.00 -0.17 -0.01  0.29 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.33 0.68        
(13) Total factor 
productivity 
0.94 0.09 -0.05 -0.04  0.04  0.01  0.09  0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.09       
(14) Political 
relations 
 0.49  0.34 -0.04  0.04  0.15 -0.00 -0.31  0.01  0.06  0.04 -0.14 -0.39 -0.64 -0.74 -0.04      
(15) Economic 
relations  
19.17 14.48 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.00  0.14  0.02  0.01 -0.04  0.12 0.26 0.65 0.73 -0.19 -0.68     
(16) Contracting 
institutions 
62.97 18.46 -0.00  0.08  0.11  0.03  0.32 -0.04 -0.01  0.06 -0.03 0.15 -0.13  0.17 -0.05 -0.21 0.10    
(17) Property right 
institutions 
35.03 19.99 -0.02  0.09 -0.06  0.06  0.19 -0.05  0.09 -0.03 -0.06  0.06 0.23 0.16 -0.09 -0.18  0.19 0.38   
(18) Survival  0.96  0.20  0.05 -0.03  0.05 -0.01  0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.05  0.08  
Correlation coefficients greater or equal to |0.05| are significant at a 5 percent level.  
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Table 2  
Results from Cox proportional hazard models 
Independent   
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Subsidiary size   -0.188*** 
(0.048) 
  -0.165*** 
(0.048) 
  -0.172*** 
(0.048) 
  -0.157*** 
(0.049) 




















Ownership ratio   -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.011*** 
(0.002) 


















Subsidiary performance   -0.190*** 
(0.041) 
  -0.172*** 
(0.043) 
  -0.152*** 
(0.041) 
  -0.148*** 
(0.042) 






Subsidiary motivation     -0.178 
(0.222) 












Parent R&D intensity    6.988** 
(2.028) 
   7.954*** 
(2.093) 
   8.077*** 
(2.072) 
   8.242*** 
(2.058) 
   7.979*** 
(2.126) 
  8.272*** 
(2.017) 
  8.051*** 
(2.087) 


























































































Political relations  1.321 
  (1.206) 
 0.776 
  (1.189) 
-0.486 
  (1.186) 
 0.469 
  (1.182) 
 0.523 
  (1.179) 
 -0.367 
  (1.172) 
 -0.402 
 (1.168) 
Economic relations     0.214† 
   (0.118) 
    0.319** 
   (0.119) 
    0.306* 
   (0.120) 
    0.359** 
   (0.121) 
    0.341** 
   (0.120) 
    0.335** 
   (0.123) 
 -0.308* 
  (0.122) 
Sector dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Period dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Contracting institutions  -0.028** 
(0.006)   
   -0.018** 
 (0.006) 
  -0.027** 
 (0.008) 
  -0.017** 
 (0.006) 
  -0.029** 
   (0.008) 
Property right 
institutions 
      -0.037*** 
    (0.006) 
   -0.032*** 
 (0.006) 
  -0.031*** 
 (0.006) 
  -0.021* 
 (0.008) 
   -0.018* 




    -0.016† 
(0.009) 
     0.019* 
   (0.010) 
Subsidiary motivation 
× Property right 
institutions 
     0.024* 
(0.011) 
    -0.027* 
    (0.012) 
Number of 
observations 
4346 4346 4346 4346 4346 4346    4346 
Log-likelihood -1245.707 -1232.542 -1224.271 -1219.031 -1217.646 -1216.777 -1214.748 
χ2  269.67***  296.00*** 312.55*** 323.03***  325.80***  327.53*** 331.59*** 
AIC 2549.41 2525.09 2508.54 2500.06 2499.29 2497.55 2495.50 
Likelihood-ratio 
Hypothesis Tests 
       
H0: βIntegrative × Cont. = 0     325.80***     5.80* 
H0: βIntegrative × Prop. = 0      327.53***    4.06* 
†p < .10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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  Fig. 1. Survival of resource-seeking and market-seeking subsidiaries in countries with less-and more-developed contracting instituions  
 
(a) Property rights institutions -1SD (15) (b) Property rights institutions +1SD (55) 
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